branch prediction<\/strong> may allow unauthorized disclosure of information to an attacker with local user access via a side-channel analysis.\u201d<\/p>\nAfter the findings arrived, on January 3, 2018, Intel responds to Paul and Jann\u2019s security research findings with this disbelieving statement: \u201cIntel believes these exploits do not have the potential to corrupt, modify or delete data.\u201d<\/p>\n
With the proof in front of them, Intel believed the research reports were flawed and incorrect. The idea of these acts caused by a \u201cbug\u201d, or a \u201cflaw\u201d was not possible. Their explanation was, \u201cthere are many types of computing devices, using different vendor\u2019s operating systems and processors. All are at risk of being exploited.\u201d<\/p>\n
But Paul\u2019s team exploited speculative execution and had solid proof.<\/strong><\/p>\nThey experimented on multiple x86 processor architectures. They used the Intel Ivy Bridge (i7-3630QM). The Intel Haswell (i7-4650U). The Intel Skylake (unspecified Xeon on Google Cloud) and finally an AMD Ryzen processor.<\/p>\n
In every test, the team observed the Spectre vulnerability across all of these CPUs. Similar results on both 32- and 64-bit modes, and both Linux and Windows. Some ARM processors also support speculative execution, and the initial testing confirmed, ARM processors could not pass the test.<\/p>\n
When they attacked using native code, they were able to read the entire victim\u2019s memory address space, including the secrets stored within it, with ease.<\/p>\n
When they attacked using Java code, they successfully read data from the address space of the browser process running it, with zero effort.<\/p>\n
The research evidence was irrefutable. <\/strong><\/p>\nTheir results showed there was a flaw in Intel chips.<\/p>\n
A day later, January 4, 2018, Intel issues updates to protect systems from security exploits. They released this statement: \u201cIntel has developed and is rapidly issuing updates for all types of Intel-based computer systems \u2014 including personal computers and servers \u2014 that render those systems immune from both exploits (referred to as \u201cSpectre\u201d and \u201cMeltdown\u201d) reported by Google Project Zero.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\nThree months later on April 2, 2018, Intel\u2019s Microcode Revision Guidance is released and what\u2019s inside exposed the truth. In this 19-page pdf document, you will find 17 product groups listed, (color-coded in red), productions halted, and update support has ended.<\/p>\n
Looking through the guide, you will find the columns listed by Product Names, Public Name, CPUID, Platform ID, Production Status, Pre-Mitigation Production MCU, STOP deploying these MCU revs, and New Production MCU Rev.<\/p>\n
The pages with the discontinued products are below:<\/p>\n
\n- Page 4: Bloomfield and Bloomfield Xeon<\/li>\n
- Page 7: Clarksfield<\/li>\n
- Page 8: Gulftown and Harpertown Xeon CO & EO<\/li>\n
- Page 11: Jasper Forest<\/li>\n
- Page 12: Penryn\/QC<\/li>\n
- Page 15: SoFIA 3GR<\/li>\n
- Page 16: Wolfdale CO, MO, EO & RO, Wolfdale Xeon CO & EO<\/li>\n
- Page 17: Yorkfield & Yorkfield Xeon<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
When you review the columns, you will see one labeled STOP deploying these MCU revs<\/strong>. Intel\u2019s definition for this column is as follows:<\/p>\n